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RECENT DECISIONS
Domestic Relations: General Appearance Bars Collateral At-

tack-A wife brought an action in a Wisconsin court to set aside a
Nevada divorce decree. She alleged that her husband had deceitfully
induced her to seek a divorce in Nevada. Allegedly having relied on his
misrepresentations she had gone to Nevada for six weeks and then
sued for divorce. The wife appeared in the action with her attorney
and the husband appeared generally by his attorney. The Nevada
court found that the the plaintiff "was and now is, a bona fide and
actual resident and domiciliary of the County of Clark, state of
Nevada . . . " and granted the wife a divorce. Immediately after obtaining the divorce she returned to Wisconsin.
She contended that the Nevada decree should not be accorded full
faith and credit in this action for two reasons: (1) both parties were
domiciled in Wisconsin at the time the Nevada divorce action was
commenced and thus the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction to grant a
divorce; (2) the Nevada decree was procured as a result of the husband's fraud and coercion. The husband demurred to the wife's complaint. The court overruled the demurrer and the husband appealed
to the supreme court.'
Relative to the jurisdictional issue the court took notice of the fact
that both parties were subject to the jurisdiction of the Nevada court;
the wife was there personally and the husband was represented by
counsel. Since both parties were in the law suit, the court held that
the issue of domicile in Nevada had become res judicata in Nevada.
The full faith and credit clause demanded that it also be res judicata
in this state, Hartensteinv. Hartenstein.2 Counsel for the wife argued
that the court was precluded from finding that the wife was domiciled
in Nevada by virtue of sec. 247.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes.' The
'The husband had remarried about a year and two months after the divorce
decree was granted. His second wife was made a party to this action. She
answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint on its merits. In support of her motion she filed an affidavit and attached an authenticated copy of the Nevada decree of divorce to her motion
for summary judgment. The court denied her motion for summary judgment.
She appealed this order together with the husband's appeal from the order
overruling his demurrer to the complaint.
2 18 Wis. 2d 505, 118 N.W. 2d 881 (1963).
3
"UMFoRm DIVORCE RECOGNMTON AcT. (1) A divorce obtained in another
jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the
marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceedings for the
divorce was commenced. (2) Proof that a person obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within 12 months prior
to the commencement of the proceeding therefore, and resumed residence
in this state within 18 months after the date of his departure therefrom,
or (b) at all times after his departure from this state, and until his return
maintained a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was commenced." Wis STAT. §247.22 (1961).
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court held that the statute is merely an evidentiary one creating a
rebuttable presumption when the issue of domicile is open for determination. The statute did not apply in this case because the issue of
4
domicile in Nevada had become res judicata.
The leading case on the issue of when divorce decrees are barred
from collateral attack by the full faith and credit clause is Sherrer v.
Sherrer,5 which held that since the finding of domicile, needed to confer jurisdiction on the court, was made in proceedings in which the
defendant appeared and participated, it was not subject to collateral
attack in another jurisdiction. One is inclined to conclude from the
Sherrer case that the mere fact of a general appearance by the defendant will entitle the decree to the protection of the full faith and
credit clause. However, the Court seems to limit the breadth of the
rule to the facts.6
Wisconsin law prior to Hartenstein was stated in Davis v. Davis.7
The defendant wife had appeared specially in the divorce action in
another state. She later brought an action in Wisconsin to annul the
divorce. The court upheld a literal "personal appearance test." After
explaining that it was aware of the meaning of general and special
appearance but that the meaning of personal appearance remained
enigmatic, the court held that until the higher court decided otherwise,
appearance must be personal or physical before a state cannot challenge a decree of another state affecting the marital status of its
citizens.
Since the adoption by Wisconsin in 1949 of the Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, sec. 247.22,8 there have been no cases expounding its
meaning. The commissioner in the Uniform Law Annotations expresses his belief that there is no conflict between the provisions of
the act stating the rule for presumption of domicile and the holding of
the Sherrer case because the act gives a principle of evidence for cases
4 The court also refused to accept as valid the wife's argument that the divorce
was not entitled to full faith and credit because she had procured it as a
result of her husband's fraud and coercion. The court reasoned that since
Wisconsin courts must accord the Nevada divorce decree such faith and
credit as it has "by law or usage in the courts" of Nevada, the issue of
whether a person can collaterally attack a divorce decree depends upon the
principle of res judicata in force in the state granting the divorce. Nevada
holds that intrinsic fraud is not a basis for vacating a divorce decree. Since
the fraud and coercion as alleged in the complaint was of the type called
intrinsic by the Nevada courts, such fraud would not sustain an action to set
aside a decree in Nevada and therefore the decree was not subject to attack
in Wisconsin.
5334 U.S. 343 (1948).
6"And where a decree of divorce is rendered by a competent court under
the circumstances of this case the obligation of full faith and credit requires
that such litigation should end in the courts of the state in which the judgment was rendered." Id. at 356.
7259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W. 2d 338 (1951).
8 See statute cited note 3 supra.
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which are not decided whereas the Sherrer rule is based on res
judicataY
The Hartenstein case appears to go beyond the holding of the
the Sherrer case10 in that it seems to hold that if a defendant appears
by counsel in a divorce case, the issues tried by the court become res
judicata as to the parties and are not subject to attack in another
jurisdiction unless subject to attack in the jurisdiction which granted
the decree. The Wisconsin court has extended Sherrer to its logical
conclusion. Whether the United States Supreme Court will extend
the Sherrer holding to the same conclusion will be seen when the
proper fact situation is contested.
Although the court in the Hartenstein case did not formally overrule the holding of the Davis case" it has thoroughly repudiated its
reasoning. The court rejects the idea that physical appearance by the
defendant is required before the decree is entitled to full faith and
credit. Whether a person is physically before the court has no bearing
on whether the matter has become res judicata. The court holds that
jurisdiction over the parties is the test. If the court has jurisdiction
over both parties the issue of domicile which is decided in an action
between them becomes res judicata.
Where the defendant makes only a special appearance he goes
before the court to contest the jurisdictional issue. In a divorce case
this is to contest the domicile of the plaintiff. Both parties are before
the court in the trying of this issue. When the decision is rendered it
becomes res judicata, appealable but not subject to collateral attack.
If the court decides that the plaintiff is domiciled in the jurisdiction
and the defendant does not see fit to appeal, the question of the
existence of domicile is closed. The plaintiff who then obtains a
divorce judgment, providing he has met all the procedural requirements of due process, is not subject to having the decree attacked on
9 But the commissioner expresses his doubts whether the two rules are totally
unrelated:
There is also the possibility that the Supreme Court of the United States
may not extend the doctrine of the Sherrer and Coe cases to bar the re-examination of the validity of a divorce obtained even after an actual contest
over the jurisdictional requirement of domicile where this rule of evidence
is applicable. The majority of the court in those cases relied heavily upon the
principle of res judicata. The facts upon which this rule of evidence rests
arise subsequent to the decree of divorce in the foreign jurisdiction. Consequently, the principle of res judicata ought not to apply since it would be
impossible to litigate in the original suit the issue presented by them. This
may be regarded by the Supreme Court as a differentiating circumstance.
9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 285.
10 The test of Sherrer might be phrased like this: did the defendant personally

appear and participate to the extent of the facts present in this case? The test
of any appearance through counsel is much broader.
11 Davis v. Davis,supra note 7.
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jurisdictional grounds. The court by way of a footnote to the Hartenstein decision12 admits that the Davis case was decided wrongly.
If anyone was hopeful that subsection 2 of the Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, sec. 247.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 3 would have
the effect of barring recognition by Wisconsin courts of divorces obtained in "quickie states," the Hartenstein decision no doubt has had
the effect of shattering this hope. The decision makes it clear that
sec. 247.22 (2) has no application in a case where the jurisdictional
issue has become res judicata. Therefore the application of this evidentiary principle is limited to cases where the foreign divorce was
obtained from a court which decided the jurisdictional question in an
ex parte proceeding.
In weighing the effect of this decision on the Family Code' 4 one
has to distinguish whether the parties living in Wisconsin and wanting
a divorce are willing to travel and "establish a foreign domicile" or
not. Concededly Wisconsin law is meant for Wisconsin residents. And
as long as neither of the parties travels, their marriage is subject to
the Family Code with its many provisions aimed at preserving marriages and discouraging divorces.
The Family Code has made the obtaining of a divorce in Wisconsin a procedurally drawn out affair. Sixty days are required between the serving of the summons and the serving of the complaint
as a "cooling off period."' 15 The family court commissioner is directed
to cause an effort to be made to effect a reconciliation.' 6 In ordinary
circumstances it takes over three months to get a divorce in Wisconsin.
And even when it is granted it does not become effective in separating
the marital status for one year. To the spouse who wants a divorce
v. Hartenstein supra note 2 at 511 by way of footnote the court
stated: In Davis v. Davis (1951), 259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W. 2d 338, this court
held that a special appearance by the nonresident's wife for the purpose of
objecting to the foreign court's jurisdiction was insufficient appearance to entitle the resulting divorce decree to full faith and credit. The opinion stressed
the fact that in the Sherrer and Coe cases the defendant spouses had been "physically present." Dean Griswold states flatly that an appearance "through an
attorney" by the defendant spouse is sufficient to entitle the decree to full
faith and credit. 65 Harvard Law Review, at p. 216. For a critical comment on
Davis v. Davis, see Anno. 28 A.L.R. 2d 1303, 1325, and Note, 69 Harvard Law
Review (1956), 1325, 1327. The latter note points out that the official transcript in Johnson v. Muelberger, supra, disclosed that the appearance by the
defendant spouse was by counsel only. The U.S. supreme court in Cook v.
Cook (1951), 342 U.S. 126, 127, 72 S.Ct. 157, 96 L.Ed. 146, decided after
Davis v. Davis, supra, has now made it clear that a special appearance entered
by counsel for defendant spouse in the divorce action in the foreign state to
contest the issue of plaintiff's domicile is sufficient appearance to entitle the
divorce decree to full faith and credit.
'a See statute cited note 3 supra.
14 The 1959 Wisconsin Legislature made far reaching changes in the laws governing marriage and divorce in Wisconsin. This codification is known as the
Wisconsin Family Code.
15 Wis. STAT. §247.061 (1) (a) (1961).
26 Wis. STAT. §247.081 (1961).
12Hartenstein
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badly the question will arise, "Why 'cool off' for sixty days in Wisconsin and be subjected to all this procrastination of reconciliation
attempts when by living for forty-two days in Nevada I can have my
divorce? All I have to do is have my spouse make a general appearance in the action through an attorney and the divorce is final and
there is nothing that Wisconsin can do about it."
Chapter 247.21 of the Wisconsin Statutes 7 attempts to render void
any divorce which was "shopped for" in another state. It would seem
that the Hartenstein case will make this statute practically ineffective.
The staute says !"no person domiciled in this state." If the parties go
to a different state and get their divorce while both are under the
court's personal jurisdiction and the court finds that they are domiciled
there, the fact of their domicile in Nevada becomes res judicata and
entitled to full faith and credit. Since they were domiciled in Nevada
they must have ceased to be "domiciled in this state" and therefore
this statute does not apply to them.
The only control that Wisconsin would seem to have now over a
divorce granted in another state is the case of an ex parte divorce.
Then the court is free to challege the jurisdiction of the foreign court
and thus collaterally attack the divorce. Whether the proceeding in
the foreign court will be ex parte or not is entirely up to the parties
of the threatened marriage. It is axiomatic in domestic relation law
that the parties of themselves cannot confer jurisdiction of the subject on the court. The axiom still holds. Yet if the parties can convince
a court of one state that it has jurisdiction over their marriage they
can effectively bar any other state from challenging that court's jurisdiction to grant a divorce.'
Since the motive of divorce is often remarriage, "shopping" for a
divorce loses much of its appeal when the Family Code restrictions
on remarriage after divorce are considered. One seeking to remarry
who has children by a former marraige must show to the satisfaction
of the court that the minor children are adequately provided for.10
Remarriage in Wisconsin within a year of being a party to a divorce
is prohibited and void.2 0 A remarriage anywhere within one year after
"No person domiciled in this state shall go into another state, territory or
country for the purpose of obtaining a judgment of annulment, divorce or
legal separation for a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this
state, or for a cause which is not ground for annulment, divorce or legal
separation under the laws of this state and a judgment so obtained shall be of
no effect in this state." Wis. STAT. §247.21 (1961).
's There is a trend in some states to easily find flaws in the previous divorce
action of a foreign state so as to justify collateral attack of such a decree.
For a discussion of several recent decisions in point, see 46 MARQ. L. REv.
383.
29 Wis. STAT. §245.10 (1961).
17

20

WIS. STAT. §245.03 (2) (1961).
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obtaining a divorce, wherever granted, is void if a party resides and
2
intends to continue to reside in this state. '

ROBERT

H.

BICHLER

Admiralty: Apportionment of Damages According to FaultLibelant's steamship, the Torondoc, while navigating the Chicago River,
collided with a bridge owned and operated by the City of Chicago.
The Federal District Court found that the acts of both parties were
proximate causes of the collision and apportioned one-third of the
negligence and damages to the City of Chicago and two-thirds to the
libelant. The facts constituting libelant's fault include: (1) inability
of the ship to stop because of excessive speed and (2) libelant's
employment of a ship's master who was inexperienced in maneuvering
a large vessel down a river spanned by a number of independent
bridges closely spaced. The facts constituting fault on the part of the
City of Chicago include (1) negligent maintenance of the electrical
control system of the bridge (span failed to open properly) (2) the
bridgetender's failure to show a red lantern when the span would not
operate. N. M. Patterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago.'
After judgment both parties appeared and moved for amendment
of the damages on grounds that the court was bound by a settled rule
of maritime law to divide damages equally in the case of a collision
arising from mutual fault. Overruling the motion, the court summed
up its reasons saying:
In view of the fact that our Supreme Court has never
ordered equal division of damages in any case where the findings
were specific that the respective degrees of contributing fault
were unequal, this court is free in this case to apportion damages
unequally, based upon the specific unequal degrees of contributing fault of which it has found each party to have been guilty.
It has always been the policy of the Supreme Court that a court
of admiralty has the discretion, flexibility and duty to do the
complete
justice inherent in the historical role of the maritime
2
court.

The court attempted to distinguish the original United States Supreme
Court decision on the subject of apporfionment of damages, The
Catherine,3 on the grounds that that case did not purport to govern
collisions occuring under other than "usual" circumstances. Thus, in
The Catherine, the United States Supreme Court said:
The question we believe has never until now come distinctly before this court for decision. The rule that prevails in
the district and circuit courts, we understand, has been to divide
§245.04 (1) (1961).
209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D.Ill., E.D. 1962).
2Id. at 591.
3 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
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